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Abstract: Recent research into difficulties in figurative language in children with ASD highlighted
that it is possible to devise training interventions to overcome these difficulties by teaching specific
strategies. This study describes how children with ASD can improve their capability to explain
metaphors with a treatment. Two types of metaphors, in the “X is Y” form, were addressed:
sensory and physico-psychological. To face the difficulties posed by these metaphors, the adult
taught two strategies: inserting the connective “is like” between “X” and “Y”, which transforms the
metaphor into a simile; comparing “X” and “Y” by means of thinking maps. Two tests of metaphor
comprehension were used, one based on sensory and the other on physico-psychological metaphors.
Sixteen 10 year-old children participated into the study, including an experimental group formed by
8 children with ASD (n = 4) which had received the treatment, and a control group (n = 4) which had
not, and 8 typically-developing (TD) children. At the post-test, the experimental group significantly
outperformed the controls in explaining both types of metaphors, but only in the sensory metaphors
did their performances reach TD children’s levels. These results illuminate how clinical treatment
can positively influence the developmental trajectories of metaphor comprehension.
Keywords: children with ASD; metaphor comprehension; sensory and physico-psychological;
treatment; assessment
1. Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD, henceforth) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized
by impairments in interaction and social communication, and restricted, repetitive behaviour and
interests [1]. Actually, it refers to an extremely heterogeneous condition whose atypical cognitive
profiles are still the object of extensive discussion among researchers (see, on this point, [2–5]).
For instance, linguistic competencies in children with ASD can range from total absence of language to
fluent language with some difficulties in pragmatic usages [6,7], typically in figurative language.
Recent research has highlighted that it is relevant [8], and possible [9–12], to devise training
interventions to overcome these difficulties by teaching ad hoc strategies. In addition to being
clearly helpful for practical reasons, research on treatment can appropriately address some theoretical
questions raised by developmental and clinical research on figurative language in children with ASD.
For instance, concerning metaphor, researchers [13] recently wondered whether differences between
children with and without ASD decrease with age, and also whether children with ASD can improve
their competencies, with or without treatment.
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In order to understand the nature of the difficulties posed by metaphors, in at least some
subgroups of children with ASD [8,14,15], we must recall the prototypical structure of metaphor,
which is “X is Y”. In the example “My daddy is a volcano”, the first term, namely, “X-daddy”, is
called the “tenor” [16] and is associated on a purely metaphorical plane to the second term, namely
“Y-volcano”, which is called the “vehicle” of the metaphor. As X cannot be Y, neither on logical nor on
factual grounds, this association poses a semantic conflict, which, nevertheless, can be solved if we
think that X resembles Y, in some way.
In other words, some semantic features of X can be viewed as similar to some semantic features
of Y, and a common semantic ground can, therefore, be established. On the other hand, to be able to
detect a common ground is only a first step towards a satisfactory solution of the semantic conflict,
because commonalities have to be adjusted to the characteristics of the tenor. For instance, in the
above example “My daddy is a volcano”, the explosive character of the volcano must be adjusted
to the behavioural characteristics of a human being [17], such as hyperactivity or hyperproductivity,
and the like, depending on the discourse context. In typical development, children gradually come
to elaborate strategies to solve this type of semantic conflict, and distinguish between statements
based on strictly logical or factual grounds from statements based on general similarities, such as
metaphors [18,19]. Nevertheless, this capability may vary as a function of the semantic nature of
different types of metaphors. For example, in the so-called “sensory metaphors” [20], X is associated
to Y on the basis of perceptual features, such as colour, shape, movement, function, and the like (e.g.,
“Hair is spaghetti”), whereas in the so-called “physico-psychological” metaphors, a person (X) is
associated to an objet (Y) on the basis of more or less abstract features (like in the above example:
“Daddy-volcano”).
Some children with ASD [14,15,21–30], instead, tend to adhere to literal meanings. When
requested to explain their position, they often say that the association between X and Y is just impossible
and must be refused. Nevertheless, it is possible to show these children that, between the two extremes
of totally true and totally false statements, there exists an acceptable intermediate solution, represented
by similarities. In order to detect similarities between the tenor and vehicle, and find an appropriate
solution to the semantic conflict, a systematic analysis of the meanings of the tenor of vehicle must be
implemented. This type of analysis can be transformed into specific strategies that adults can teach.
For instance, Mashal and Kasirer [9] used thinking maps as a tool to enable a group of 20 children
with ASD (age range: 12–15 years) to visualize the semantic relations in metaphors. For instance, for the
metaphor “train of thought”, children had to write the two terms “train” and “thought” in two bubbles,
and their semantic associations in surrounding bubbles. To make children understand the metaphor,
the researchers instructed them to write the appropriate associations between train and thought, which,
in this case, could point to the idea of “continuity” or of “connected thoughts”. The children had to
exclude irrelevant associations between “train” and other words (for example, “car” or “engines”, etc.)
as well as between “thought” and other words (for example, “brain” or “in the head”). In a multiple
case-study, Persicke and colleagues [10] used a guided procedure to train three children with ASD
(age range: 5–7 years) to compare the terms of the metaphors, which, in this case, were embedded in
stories. Step by step, each child was guided towards abstracting the relevant shared semantic features
while rejecting the irrelevant ones. Melogno, Pinto, and Orsolini [12] report on training used with
a single child with ASD (8–10 years) aimed at enhancing metaphor comprehension. The training
consisted in teaching two strategies, implemented by means of three main activities. In the first activity,
two strategies were taught. The first, called the “X is like Y heuristic”, consisting of exercises training
the child to inhibit a literal interpretation, changing a metaphor into the corresponding simile (“X is like
Y”). The second strategy, or comparative strategy, was based on the use of thinking maps to search for
semantic similarities between X and Y. In the second activity, the child was asked to use unconventional
labels to rename objects, or images, or people in a metaphorical sense (for example, “flour” renamed as
“snow”). The third activity, “story-matching”, required the child to find the appropriate metaphorical
ending to a story, by choosing between two pre-coded alternatives. It is worth noting that all of the
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studies that described training procedures to improve metaphor comprehension we reported so far
highlighted beneficial effects beyond the differences in the age of the participants.
The present study expanded the type of training described in the abovementioned
Melogno et al.’s article [12] and was implemented in a small group formed by an adult and four
children. The group modality was preferred to the individual one in that it highlights the stimulating
role of different perspectives in explaining metaphors. In other words, each interpretation proposed
by children addresses a distinct facet of the same metaphor and stimulates the construction of new
meanings. However, in this study we only reported on the outcomes of the treatment, as measured at
pre- and post-test, while the qualitative analysis of the adult–children’s interactions can be the object
of a further work.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen children participated into this study, eight diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder
(ASD; age range: 9–10 years old) and eight typically-developing children (TD; age range: 9–10 years
old). The children with ASD received their diagnosis in a neuropsychiatry center (University of
Rome “Sapienza”, according to DSM IV’s [31] (Autistic disorder) criteria (At the time of the diagnosis,
these were the criteria that were in force) by using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS) [32,33] and Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) [34,35]. Four of these children
(conventionally named Child F, L, A, and G) formed the experimental group and the other four (Child
1, 2, 3, and 4), the control group. The assignment of the children to each group was made on a random
basis. All were males.
The eight TD children (four males and four females) were recruited in a school attended by
children of average SES families. Based on teachers’ statements, none of them had any type of
behavioural disorder or learning disability. The eight children with ASD were recruited from a larger
group on the basis of the following criteria: age range (9–10); both Full Scale IQ and Verbal IQ ≥ 85
(WISC III (At the time of this study, WISC III was the only version of the Wechsler scales available in
Italy.) [36,37]; lexical performances (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, PPVT), [38,39] and grammatical
performances (Test of Reception of Grammar, TROG 2) [40,41] within norms; a drop in figurative
language comprehension greater than 1.5 standard deviation below the mean, as measured by a subtest
of a battery (APL Medea; it: Abilità Pragmatiche nel Linguaggio Medea; en: Pragmatic Language
Abilities Medea) [42]. This subtest requires the child to listen to metaphors (ex: “Mark is a lion”) and
idioms (“He always has his head in the clouds”), and explain the meaning (four items), and indicate
the picture that matches the appropriate meaning by choosing among four possibilities (four items).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for IQ scores (full scale, and verbal and performance
scales), vocabulary (PPVT), grammar (TROG 2), and figurative language (APL). Student’s t tests for
independent groups were applied to all the measures just described, for both the experimental and
control groups. The two groups did not differ in age (t: –0.8703; df: 6; p: 0.4175), Full Scale IQ (t: 0.4155;
df: 6; p: 0.6922), Verbal IQ (t: 0.4285; df: 6; p: 0.6831), Performance IQ (t: 1.3727; df: 6; p: 0.2189),
vocabulary (t: 0.4931; df: 6; p: 0.6394), grammar (t: –0.3624; df: 6; p: 0.7294), and figurative language
comprehension (t: –0.4902; df: 6; p: 0.6413).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for IQ scores (Full scale, Verbal, Performance). Peabody, TROG 2, APL., in the experimental and control groups (mean, standard
deviation, range).
Age Full Scale IQ VIQ PIQ Peabody TROG 2 Metaphors APL
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Exp. G. 121.75 2.2173 119–124 99.25 3.8622 95–103 90.75 2.0615 89–93 108.25 4.5734 103–113 103.00 5.3541 98–10 9 101.00 5.2281 97–108 –1.8425 0.1286 –1.65–1.92
Contr. G. 123.00 1.8257 121–125 98.25 2.8722 95–102 90.00 2.8284 86–92 102.00 7.8740 95–113 101.50 2.8867 98–105 102.25 4.5000 97–108 –1.9025 0.2082 –1.65–2.16
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2.2. The Research Design
After approval from the Ethics Committee of the Department of Pediatrics and Child
Neuropsychiatry, “Sapienza University of Rome, we asked for informed consent from the children’s
parents, who accepted to having their children involved in this study.
The study applied a before-after design, with an experimental group opposed to a control group,
both assessed at pre- and post-test. At time 1 (pre-test), sensory and physico-psychological metaphors
comprehension was assessed. At time 2, the treatment was implemented only with the experimental
group, and at time 3 (post-test), the same abilities were assessed again in both groups. The study was
conducted from June to July.
2.3. Measures
To assess metaphor comprehension, we chose two tests measuring the capability to explain
the meaning of metaphors, one devised for young children (4–6 years), the Junior Metaphor
Comprehension Test (henceforth, Jnr MCT) [43], and the other, the Metaphor Comprehension Test
for older children (9–14 years; henceforth, MCT) (A psychologist trained to administer the jnr MCT
and the MCT was responsible for the administration and blind to all the issues concerning the
intervention.) [44]. Both tests have been validated on TD Italian-speaking children. The Jnr MCT is
composed of 12 metaphors embedded in sentences, and 13 metaphors contextualized in four stories.
Nearly all of these metaphors are “sensory”, e.g., “The moon is a light bulb”, where “moon” pertains
to the domain of “celestial bodies” and “light bulb” to that of “electric devices”. The MCT is composed
of 12 physico-psychological metaphorical sentences, such as “The guardian of the prison is a rock”,
where “guardian” pertains to the domain of “human beings” and “rock” to the physical domain.
In both tests, questions and answers are purely verbal; the administration is preceded by an example
the examiner considers together with the child in order to make him/her understand that the items can
be analysed on explicit and consistent grounds. No further feedback is given to the child’s answers.
In both tests, the coding system is based on qualitative levels, transformed into quantitative scales,
a three-step scale for the Jnr MCT, and a four-step scale for the MCT. Each qualitative level represents
a step in the process of solving the semantic conflict inherent in metaphors.
2.3.1. Jnr MCT
• A score of 0 is assigned when the child declares he/she just does not know (elusion of the conflict),
or refuses the possibility of using words metaphorically (refusal of the conflict), or interprets the
metaphor literally (literal interpretation).
• A score of 1 is assigned when one semantic feature common to both terms of the metaphor
is identified. This represents a relevant common ground, based on functional or perceptual
characteristics, which partially solves the conflict.
• A score of 2 is assigned when the explanation considers both differences and resemblances
between the two terms of the metaphor. This represents an elaborated common ground,
which solves the conflict in a more accomplished way.
The maximum score for the Jnr MCT is 50.
2.3.2. MCT
• As in the Jnr MCT, a score of 0 is assigned when the child declares he/she just does not know
(elusion of the conflict), or refuses the possibility of using words metaphorically (refusal of the
conflict), or interprets the metaphor literally (literal interpretation).
• A score of 1 is assigned when the child provides a common ground between tenor and vehicle
based on physical features.
• A score of 2 is assigned when the child provides a more elaborated common ground between
tenor and vehicle, where the psychological features are explicitly indicated.
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• A score of 3 is assigned when the psychological features that justify the common ground between
tenor and vehicle are further refined.
The maximum score for the MCT is 36.
Jnr MCT has high reliability, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (860), high test-retest correlations
(r–tt: 0.848), and high inter-rater agreement, as measured by Cohen’s K (68 for the four year-olds; 0.73
for the five year olds, and 0.74 for the six year olds).
MCT has high reliability, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (70), high test-retest correlations: r–tt:
0.83, and high inter-rater agreement, as measured by Cohen’s K (75 for the 9–10 year-olds; 0.74 for the
11 year-olds; 0.67 for the 12 year-olds; 0.81 for the 13 year-olds).
2.4. Treatment
The experimental training was based on the theoretical grounds and hypotheses put forward
in the abovementioned study by Melogno and colleagues [12]. On the assumption that metaphors
are based on a semantic conflict, they propose to approach this type of conflict as a problem-solving
activity. To this end, they actively analyze the meanings of both tenor and vehicle in search for a
semantic common ground. They also hypothesize that children with ASD can be taught to inhibit literal
interpretations, switch flexibly from one semantic feature to another when analyzing the meanings of
tenor and vehicle.
Differently from Melogno et al.’s study [12], only the first two activities were implemented. The
first activity aimed at teaching strategy 1 (“X is like Y heuristic”) by means of cards (see Table 2).
The objective was to induce children to rephrase the expression “X is Y” as “X is like Y”. The first
activity also included strategy 2 or comparative strategy (thinking maps were used as a tool to search
for semantic similarities between X and Y). Both strategies were modelled by the adult, then practised
in joint activity, and then the children had to apply them on their own. At the end of each phase of these
activities, the adult stimulated a recapitulation of what had been said in the form of a metalinguistic
reflection. Table 2 illustrates strategy 1 and 2 in these three phases.
Table 2. Examples of activities with strategy 1 (“X is like Y heuristic”), and 2 (Comparative strategy).
Example of modelling
Adult: “When you listen at someone saying ‘a daisy is an umbrella’, you certainly know that a daisy cannot be
an umbrella. A daisy is a flower and an umbrella is an object. To understand the meaning of this sentence, I
will use my first strategy. I will put “Is like” between “daisy” (X) and “umbrella” (Y) and the sentence becomes
“A daisy is like an umbrella”.
Strategy 1: “Is like strategy”
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ribs, and it protects us from the rain. Right. 
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has a shape that looks like an open umbrella.”  
Strategy 2: Comparative strategy 
Now, I will use my second strategy. I’ll be thinking of t e characteristics of the daisy and write them dow
here in y thinking map. Then, I’ll write that daisies are flowers, that they have a stem, a corolla, they are
white . . . .etc.
Now, it’s umbrella’s turn. I’ll be writing its characteristics down in my map. An umbrella has a dome, a
handle, a tube, ribs, and it protects us from the rain. Right.
Now, I’ll see which characteristics are appropriate for both daisies and umbrellas. For instance, “Are they both
flowers? No. Then I’ll reject ‘flowers’. “Daisies have a stem”. Umbrellas don’t have stems, they have tubes.
Still, we can say that stems look like tubes. And also, the open dome of an umbrella looks like the corolla of a
daisy . . . .Then, I got it: a daisy has a shape that looks like an open umbrella.”
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Table 2. Cont.
Strategy 2: Comparative strategy
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s me shape.”
Example of joint activity
(1) Adult: “What does it mean that ‘My classmate is a butter and jam sandwich’?”
(2) Child G: “But it’s absolutely fake! A classmate is a living being. Butter and jam are food for breakfast”.
(3) Child F: “It’s impossible. It’s a grammatical error. The right sentence is: ‘My classmate has a butter and
jam sandwich’”.
(4) Adult: “Ok, ok. Put this way, the sentence looks like an error. Let’s try to use our first strategy . . . . . . .”
(5) Child L: “let’s put ‘is like’ between “classmate” and “butter and jam”, and then the sentence becomes
‘My classmate is like a butter and jam sandwich’”.
(6) Adult: “That’s it: ‘My classmate is like a butter and jam sandwich”’.
Now, let’s use our second strategy (Comparative strategy).
(7) Adult: “In this bubble I’ll write ‘classmate’.
Which characteristics can you tell me about ‘classmate’?”.
(8) Child L: “Living being”.
(9) Child G: “He is sitting next to you”
(10) Child L: “He has a backpack like you”.
(11) Adult: “And now, tell me about the characteristics of ‘butter and jam sandwich’”.
(12) Child F: “‘food’, ‘sticky’, ‘sweet’”.
(13) Child A: “‘flour’, ‘sugar”.
(14) Adult: “Ok. Now, let’s see which characteristics we’ll keep and which ones we’ll reject.” (Children reject
all the characteristics except two: ‘sticky’ and sweet’).
(15) Child G: “He is sitting next to you, so he’s is sticky just as jam sticks to bread”.
(16) Adult: “Very good! Now, we only need to find something for ‘sweet’. When we say ‘this classmate is
‘sweet’, what do we mean?”
(17) Child A: “That he eats bread and jam.”
(18) Child G: “That he is kind because he lends his things. If you forget your eraser, he will lend it to you and
you must thank him. He is your best friend.”
Metalinguistic reflection
The adult recapitulate nd proposes the following solution: “When one says ‘my classmate is like a butter and
jam sa dwich’ it ctually means this classmate is a close friend.”
Example of autonomous activity
Children are given a written sentence: “In summer, meadows are blankets”. Then, they individually use
strategy 1 and 2, and at the end, the adult asks each of them: “What does it mean, then, that ‘In summer,
meadows are blankets’?”.
Metalinguistic reflection
The adult makes the children notice that various answers are acceptable, as, for instance: ”Meadows can be
used like blankets because they cover the earth with a soft surface, and you can play on it in various ways.”
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The second activity, called “renaming” had two variants, one with objects and the other with
persons. In the first variant (See Table 3, Column a), the adult presented an object or an image and asks
the children to rename it (a). Then he is asked to justify the reasons for choosing the new label (b), and
to select an image that matches the label chosen for the renaming (c). In the end, he asked to phrase
the association between the object (X) and the new label that had been chosen (Y) for renaming in the
form “X is Y” (d). In the second variant (see Table 3, Column b), the same pattern applied, except
for the selection of the image (point c, above). Renaming addressed three categories: animals, fruit,
and objects.
Table 3. Examples of renaming activities.
(a) Object Renaming (b) Person Renaming
In a circle time, the adult shows a tennis ball and says: In a circle time, the adult proposes the renaming
game in the following terms:
(1) “Let’s play our renaming game. We will look at
this and try to give it a new name.
(2) Child F: “A small ball”.
(3) Child G: “Tennis”.
(4) Adult: “Ok. But now let’s try to invent a new
name for this object“.
(5) Child L: “A lemon”.
(6) Adult: “Then, a tennis ball is a lemon. Why?”
(7) Child L: “It’s yellow”.
(8) Adult: “Oh, then it’s for the color?”
(9) Child G: “A yellow stone”.
(10) Adult: “Why?”
(11) Child G: “Because they both roll”.
(12) Child F: “Because it’s a bit hairy”.
(13) Child A: “Then, it’s the sun . . . .The sun is a
planet”.
(14) Child F: “No! The sun is a star!”
(15) Child A: “It’s a planet because of the shape!”
(16) Child F: “No, it’s because of the color”.
(17) Adult (Addressing child F): “You said the tennis
ball is a bit hairy. How could we rename it?”
(18) Child F: “A ball of cotton.”
At this point, the adult asks children to match the
images related to the new labels to the appropriate
object.
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asks the children to rename it (a). Then he is asked to justify the reasons for choosing the new label 
(b), and to select an image that matches the label chosen for the renaming (c). In the end, he asked to 
phrase the association between the object (X) and the new label that had been chosen (Y) for renaming 
in the form “X is Y” (d). In the second variant (see Table 3, Column b), the same pattern applied, 
except for the selection of the image (point c, above). Renaming addressed three categories: animals, 
fruit, and objects. 
Table 3. Examples of renaming activities. 
(a) Object Renaming (b) Person Renaming 
In a circle time, the adult shows a tennis ball and 
says: 
In a circle time, the adult proposes the renaming game 
in the following terms: 
(1) “Let’s play our rena ing ga e. e ill look 
at this and try to give it a new name. 
(2) Child F: “A small ball”. 
(3) Child G: “Tennis”. 
(4) Adult: “Ok. But now let’s try to invent a new 
name for this object“. 
(5) Child L: “A lemon”. 
(6) Adult: “Then, a tennis ball is a lemon. Why?” 
(7) Child L: “It’s yellow”. 
(8) Adult: “Oh, then it’s for the color?” 
(9) Child G: “A yellow stone”. 
(10) Adult: “Why?” 
(11) Child G: “Because they both roll”. 
(12) Child F: “Because it’s a bit hairy”. 
(13) Child A: “Then, it’s the sun….The sun is a 
planet”. 
(14) Child F: “No! The sun is a star!” 
(15) Child A: “It’s a planet because of the shape!” 
(16) Child F: “No, it’s because of the color”. 
(17) Adult (Addressing child F): “You said the 
tennis ball is a bit hairy. How could we 
rename it?” 
(18) Child F: “A ball of cotton.” 
At this point, the adult asks children to match the 
images related to the new labels to the 
appropriate object. 
 
Lastly, he invites children to phrase the outcome 
of the renaming in the form “X is Y”. Ex: “A 
tennis ball is a lemon”. 
(1) Adult: “Let’s pretend a person can be renamed as 
an animal. (Addressing child F). If you were an 
animal, what would be your name?” 
(2) Child F: ……“A lion”. 
(3) Adult: “Lets’ ask child F why he renamed himself 
as a lion”. 
(4) Child F: “Because a lion is strong”. 
(5) Child L: “A lion is a carnivorous mammal”. 
(6) Child G: “It’s a feline”….but the lion is different 
from the lioness because it has a mane”. 
(7) Adult: “Then, a lion is strong, carnivorous, a feline 
and has a mane. Then, if we say ‘he is a lion’ we 
are not talking about an animal but a person. And 
what does it mean that ‘he is a lion’?” 
(8) Child G: “He has much hair and a beard like a 
mane”. 
(9) Adult: “Ok, let’s go on. (Addressing child L) And 
you, if you were an animal?”. 
(10) Child L: “Oh, I got it. Sure, no doubt, I would be a 
horse.” 
(11) Adult: “Try to explain us”. 
(12) Child L: “When it’s small, it’s a foal. Then it grows 
up and becomes a horse. I adore horses.” 
(13) Adult: “But when we say someone is a horse, what 
do we mean?” 
(14) Child A: “That he can practise many sports and 
games”. 
(15) Adult: “Can you explain it better?” 
(16) Child A: “A horse can swim, run and jump. Then, 
it’s a sportsman.” 
  
Lastly, he invites children to phrase the outcome of
the renaming in the form “X is Y”. Ex: “A tennis ball
is a lemon”.
(1) Adult: “Let’s pretend a person can be renamed
as an animal. (Addressing child F). If you were
an animal, what would be your name?”
(2) Child F: . . . . . . “A lion”.
(3) Adult: “Lets’ ask child F why he rena ed
himself as a lion”.
(4) Child F: “Because a lion is strong”.
(5) Child L: “A lion is a carnivorous mammal”.
(6) Child G: “It’s a feline” . . . .but the lion is
different from the lioness because it has a
mane”.
(7) Adult: “Then, a lion is strong, carnivorous, a
feline and has a mane. Then, if we say ‘he is a
lion’ we are not talking about an animal but a
person. And what does it mean that ‘he is a
lion’?”
(8) Child G: “He has much hair and a beard like a
mane”.
(9) Adult: “Ok, let’s go o . (Addressing child L)
And you, if you were an animal?”.
(10) Child L: “Oh, I got it. Sure, no doubt, I would
be a horse.”
(11) Adult: “Try to explain us”.
(12) Child L: “When it’s small, it’s a foal. Then it
grows up and becomes a horse. I adore horses.”
(13) Adult: “But when we say someone is a horse,
what do we mean?”
(14) Child A: “That he can practise many sports and
games”.
(15) Adult: “Can you explain it better?”
(16) Child A: “A horse can swim, run and jump.
Then, it’s a sportsman.”
The treatment has been implemented for three weeks, twice a week (six sessions in all), for about
90 min per session. Table 4 shows the schedule of the activities in each session.
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Table 4. Schedule of the activities in each session.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
“X is like
heuristics” and
comparative
strategy
Two activities
modeled by the
adult with
sensory
metaphors
Two joint
activities
with sensory
metaphors
One joint activity with
a sensory metaphor
and one modeled
activity with a
physico-psychological
metaphor
Two joint activities
with two
physico-psychological
metaphors
Two joint activities
with two
physico-psychological
metaphors
Two autonomous
activities, one with a
sensory metaphor,
and the other with a
physico-psychological
metaphor
Object
renaming Four objects Four objects Four objects
Person
renaming Animals Fruit Objects
In the whole, children have been involved in 12 “X is like Y” exercises, 12 objects, and three person
renaming activities. Twelve metaphors have been used, six sensory and six physico-psychological.
None of the metaphors used for the assessment was included in the exercises.
3. Results
Raw and t scores obtained by the experimental group with the Jnr MCT and the MCT, at pre- and
post-test, have been compared to those obtained by the control group (Table 5).
To compare the performances of the experimental and control groups with Jnr MCT and MCT,
at both pre- and post-test, two Student’s t tests have been applied to the standardized total scores
obtained by each group.
Table 6 shows that there were no differences at pre-test, whereas, at post-test, the experimental
group performed significantly higher at both Jnr MCT (t: 6, 9413; p < 0, 0004) and MCT (t: 5, 4369; p <
0, 0016). It is to be noted that, at the MCT (post-test), only one child (Child L) reached a T score within
the average range (40–60) while the others were positioned at lower-average level (30–40).
Table 5. Raw and t scores at the Jnr MCT and MCT, pre- and post-test. Experimental and control groups.
Jnr MCT Pre-test Jnr MCT Post-Test MCT Pre-test MCT Post-Test
Raw Score t Score Raw Score t Score Raw Score t Score Raw Score t Score
Exp Child L 27 60 43 89 3 29 12 49
Exp Child A 20 47 35 74 2 27 8 40
Exp Child G 20 47 44 91 3 29 8 40
Exp Child F 14 36 37 78 2 27 7 38
Con Child 1 16 40 17 41 1 25 2 27
Con Child 2 21 49 22 51 2 27 2 27
Con Child 3 24 54 24 54 3 29 3 29
Con Child 4 20 47 20 47 2 27 3 29
Table 6. Student’s t tests for independent groups (experimental versus control) applied to Jnr MCT
and MCT.
Jnr. MCT MCT
Pre-Test Post-Test Pre-Test Post-Test
Mean t p DS Mean t P DS Mean t p DS Mean t p DS
Exp. G 47.50 0.00 1.00 9.8149 83.00 6.9413 0.0004 8.2865 28.00 1 0.3559 1.1547 41.75 5.4369 0.0016 4.9244
Contr. G 47.50 5.8022 48.25 5.6199 27.00 1.6329 28.00 1.1547
As the upper age for the Jnr MCT is six years, whereas all our participants were between nine and
10 years, the performances of the experimental children were compared to those of eight TD children
of the same age. In this case, as the standardized scores only apply up to six years, we performed the
Student’s t test on the raw scores (Exp: m.: 39, 75; sd: 4, 4253; TD: m.: 43,25; sd: 2, 3145). At post-test,
children with ASD performed very similarly to the TD children, and the difference was only close to
significance (t: –1, 8422; p < 0, 09552).
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4. Discussion
In this article, we presented a preliminary study on training whose aim was to enhance the
comprehension of sensory and physico-psychological metaphors in children with ASD. The distinction
between these two types of metaphors is based on developmental literature, where it appears that
explaining metaphors in childhood may vary as a function of the semantic complexity of these
metaphors, with an advantage for the sensory type [20,28].
Eight children with ASD, internally homogeneous for age (age range: 9–10 years): intellectual level,
basic lexical and grammatical competencies, and a weakness in figurative language comprehension,
participated into this study. An experimental group and a control group were created on a random
basis, the experimental group being chosen in view of the treatment. Both groups were assessed in
metaphor comprehension before and after the treatment (pre- and post-test) by means of two metaphor
comprehension tests, the Jnr MCT [43], which measures sensory metaphors, and the MCT [44],
which measures physico-psychological metaphors.
The training consisted of three main activities led by an adult together with the children. These
activities were: (a) the “X is like Y heuristic”, where children were taught to insert the connective “like”
between the two terms of a metaphor in order to convert it into a simile; (b) the “comparative strategy”,
using thinking maps to stimulate comparisons between the features of each term of the metaphor; and
(c) renaming objects and individuals with metaphorical labels [12].
After six sessions, the experimental children significantly improved their capability to explain
both types of metaphors, as measured by each test of metaphor comprehension. On the other hand,
there were no significant improvements in the control group when comparing their performances at
pre- and post-test. It might be argued that the repetition of the same tests after a relatively short time
might have facilitated the retrieval of correct answers. However, in both metaphor comprehension
tests, the request is not to identify a pre-coded answer but to explain the meaning of the metaphors in
one’s own words. In addition, as pointed out in the Materials and Methods section, children received
no feedback on their answers during the administration so that they could not memorize a particular
solution. Lastly, if the improvements of the experimental group at post-test were due to the repetition
of the tests, we could not explain why the control group did not improve at all, although it received
exactly the same tests.
The experimental group was also compared to a TD group, matched by age, in order to see
whether the advance in sensory metaphors, which could be attributed to the training, raised them to
the level shown by 10 year-old TD children. At post-test, the experimental children’s performances
at the Jnr MCT were just slightly lower than those of the TD children. It is to be noted that, after
the training, the performances at the MCT were still at a lower-average level for three out of four
children. This outcome can be explained by the greater semantic complexity of the metaphors of
the MCT, as these require two distinct domains to be bridged, one outer and tangible, and the other,
inner and immaterial, as in the above “daddy-volcano” example. In other words, to interpret a
physico-psychological metaphor, it is not sufficient to identify the common features between tenor
and vehicle, it is also necessary to adjust them to the characteristics of the tenor. Some characteristics
must be inhibited as irrelevant, in order to shift from one of the meanings of a word to other possible
meanings [45,46]. In addition, physico-psychological metaphors require to handle psychological
knowledge and mental lexicon, which, for children with ASD, represent a typical weakness, and this
might account for their generally fuzzy and incomplete explanations [47].
On qualitative grounds, it is worth noting that, in our study, children sometimes showed an
interesting evolution in the course of the same activity—be it metaphor explanation or renaming—from
literal answers to more flexible and appropriate interpretations. For instance, during a joint activity,
Child G and Child F (Table 2, turn 2 and 3) initially refused the metaphor very firmly (“But it’s
absolutely fake!”; “It’s impossible!”). In a later turn (turn 12), Child F started analyzing some relevant
features of the metaphor at hand. Child G synthesized elements coming from Child F’s analysis (turn
15) and his own comment (turn 9): “He is sitting next to you, so he’s sticky just as jam sticks to bread”.
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In turn 18, Child G’s interpretation became fully psychological: “He’s kind because he lends his things.
If you forget your eraser, he will lend it to you and you must thank him. He is your best friend.”
Likewise, in object renaming, Child F passes from a tautological renaming (turn 2) to a
spontaneous justification of other children’s renamings (turn 12 and 16), up to his own, appropriate,
new label. A future study could highlight how this type of evolution reflects the ways in which
the adult stimulates children to go beyond their first reactions, by repeating and recapitulating their
answers and by asking them to justify their positions.
In this study, we can point to two essential novelties. The first one is that the treatment
addressed two types of metaphors, sensory and physico-psychological. This was a double challenge
in that these types represent two different levels of semantic complexity and, more importantly, this
distinction is hardly considered in the literature on children with ASD. The other novelty is the group
modality, which seems to amplify the interactions between the participants, and, as a consequence,
the possibilities to identify a common ground between tenor and vehicle. Although the analysis of
these interactions was not the primary focus of this paper, excerpts in Tables 2 and 3 provide several
examples of how the participants handled relevant meanings. An in-depth analysis of these aspects of
the treatment can be the object of a future work.
We would also like to point to two limitations. Firstly, the sample size is clearly restricted, which
gives this study a preliminary character; secondly, we only considered the “X is Y” form of metaphors,
which is prototypical, but not exhaustive. Therefore, the generalizability of the outcomes of the
treatment should be verified also with other types of metaphors and metaphorical usages, such as
metaphorical adjectives and verbs. This would enable us to verify whether the training can produce a
“near transfer effect,” that is, enhancing the capability of handling metaphorical usages, in general;
thirdly, there has been no follow-up study to test the solidity of the results across time. As the research
was conducted during summer, we could not also check for the transfer of the results to academic
competencies, for example on text comprehension.
We believe that the results, although preliminary, can contribute to the theoretical debate on
metaphor comprehension in children with ASD. One of the gaps in the literature in this field is
that the samples considered are generally very heterogeneous. In our study, instead, the sample
was considerably homogeneous in terms of age range, IQ, and basic semantic and grammatical
competencies, which were all adequate. The apparent adequacy of the profile of this subgroup reopens
the debate on the type of cognitive and linguistic skills that are necessary to understand figurative
language, or on the integration of these skills [9,14,25,28,30]. On the other hand, the outcomes of our
study suggest that a clinical treatment can at least partially contribute to the evolution of metaphor
comprehension in these children with ASD.
Future research should explore the relevant changes that take place in metaphor comprehension
from early childhood to adult age in individuals with ASD. Among the many factors involved in this
evolution, specific treatments represent a significant concurrent element.
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